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Keeping Boumediene off the
Battlefield: Examining Potential
Implications of the Boumediene v.
Bush Decision to the Conduct of
United States Military Operations
Colonel Fred K. Ford*
I.

Boumediene and the Historical Precedent

The Supreme Court of the United States, by its June 2008
holding in Boumediene v. Bush,1 granted the right of habeas
corpus to the enemy detainees held by the Department of
Defense (“DoD”) at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. This landmark
ruling granted rights to enemy fighters heretofore foreclosed
and left open the potential for further extension of rights under
the laws of the United States to enemy fighters detained
overseas. In particular, the Court’s decision has implications
in two general areas: (1) the application of the habeas right to
foreign fighters detained in locations other than Guantanamo
* Colonel, U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps, currently serving
as the Staff Judge Advocate, Multi-National Security Transition CommandIraq, Baghdad, Iraq. This Essay was written when the author served as a
Fellow at the Department of Justice and satisfies in part the requirements of
the U.S. Army War College Fellowship program. The views expressed are
those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S.
Army, Department of Justice, or the U.S. Government. The author wishes to
thank Pace Law Review editors Joseph Marutollo and Patrick Petrocelli for
their superb patience and assistance and the members of the Office of the
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, for their kindness and hospitality
during the Fellowship academic year and for the professionally enriching
experience they provided.
1. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262, 2274 (2008) (holding that
the Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution applies to Guantanamo Bay
and that congressional attempts to create habeas-like procedures were
insufficient). The Suspension Clause states that the habeas writ “shall not be
suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety
may require it.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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Bay; and (2) the application of other constitutional and
statutory rights to persons stopped or detained by U.S. military
forces during military operations. While the Court attempted,
through the use of restrictive language, to limit application of
the Boumediene decision to Guantanamo Bay, it stopped short
of explicitly doing so. As a result, leaders within the DoD may
be forced to consider Boumediene in planning and waging
future military operations. Organizational change, including
adjustments to policy, structure, and tactics, may be required.
Additionally, troops on the ground may be forced to operate
within the confines of Boumediene, figuratively loading their
already full combat assault packs with the heavy rocks of
constitutional procedures and protections normally reserved for
domestic police operations.
The U.S. military adheres to a historical legal precedent
and framework regarding the capture and detention of foreign
enemies engaged in hostilities against the United States.2 Our
country has a history of engaging in overseas wars, capturing
prisoners, and holding them in overseas and domestic camps
controlled by U.S. forces. Generally, these detainees have been
entitled to the panoply of legal protections afforded by
international law, primarily the Geneva Conventions.
Historically, however, these prisoners and detained persons3
have not had the right to petition U.S. courts for release when
they are located outside the country’s borders. That is, they
have not enjoyed the right of habeas corpus. Boumediene
2. See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); Rasul v. Bush,
542 U.S. 466 (2004).
3. Whether termed “enemy combatant,” “detained person,” “prisoner of
war,” or other title, foreign fighters captured in defense of the nation possess
some measure of rights under the law and are entitled to an appropriate
degree of protection and security. Since Boumediene, an argument can be
made that the new functional analysis test created by the Court, and
discussed herein, applies as much to “enemy combatants” as it does to
traditional prisoners of war who are entitled to the protections of Geneva.
For a comprehensive pre-Boumediene discussion asserting that labels and
status do matter, see Geoffrey S. Corn, Enemy Combatants and Access to
Habeas Corpus: Questioning the Validity of the Prisoner of War Analogy, 5
SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 2 (2007). Further, this Essay will not address
application of Boumediene to other locations where the United States might
arguably exercise functional control, such as overseas embassies, and
consulates, and alleged intelligence “black sites.”
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changed the legal landscape in this area.
In determining that Guantanamo detainees have the right
of habeas corpus, the Court appeared to attempt to limit
application of this new precedent to the unique circumstances
of Guantanamo Bay. In its holding, the Court fashioned a new
test to determine whether a foreign fighter detained overseas
may rely on the habeas right4 and rejected a de jure
sovereignty analysis.5 Simply detaining enemy fighters on
foreign territory is no longer sufficient to prevent application of
the habeas right. Instead, the Court held that a petitioning
foreign enemy detainee held overseas enjoys the right of
habeas corpus if the United States, though not possessing legal
sovereignty over the area, maintains functional control over the

4. As discussed infra, the Court indicated its tendency to extend rights
to the Guantanamo detainees when it decided the case of Rasul v. Bush, 542
U.S. 466 (2004). In Rasul, the Court, in a precedential decision, granted the
petitioning detainees (foreign fighters detained at Guantanamo) statutory
habeas rights under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006). Rasul, 542 U.S. at 483. The
United States had never previously granted such rights to foreign enemies
detained overseas. Attempting to statutorily overrule Rasul, Congress
passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, granting Guantanamo detainees
the right to a habeas-like procedure. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680. Similarly, in 2006, the Court struck down the
military commissions process established for the prosecution of certain
Guantanamo Bay detainees. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 613 (2006).
In response, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006,
establishing new military commissions procedures intended to meet the
Court’s concerns. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366,
120 Stat. 2600. These two cases and the commensurate congressional
reaction suggest that Congress may yet again legislate in response to
Boumediene. This Essay does not address a congressional fix to Boumediene
but instead focuses on possible implications of Congressional inaction. In any
event, Congress has already shown an interest in the Boumediene decision.
See, e.g., MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., BOUMEDIENE V.
BUSH: GUANTANAMO DETAINEES’ RIGHT TO HABEAS CORPUS 11 (2008), available
at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34536.pdf (noting that “Boumediene did not
necessarily bar all legislation” responsive to the ruling). For a discussion of
some measures Congress could take to alleviate Boumediene‟s impact, see
Implications of the Supreme Court‟s Boumediene v. Bush Decision for
Detainees at Guantanamo Bay: Before the H. Armed Services Comm., 110th
Cong. (2008) (opening statement of Daniel J. Dell’Orto, Acting General
Counsel,
Department
of
Defense),
available
at
http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/FC073108/DellOrto_Testimony073108.pd
f.
5. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2253.
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prisoner.6 In order to determine whether the United States
maintains functional control, the Court rejected the traditional
black-and-white analysis of legal sovereignty and adopted a
more nuanced test.7 Under the new test, a court reviews the
“objective factors and practical concerns” associated with the
detention to determine whether the United States exercises
functional control over the detained enemy fighter.8
In the case of Guantanamo Bay, the Court pointed out that
an indefinite lease with the Cuban government affords the
United States an unprecedented amount of autonomy.9 Using
the phrase “total military and civil control,”10 the Court
reasoned, in essence, that the United States possessed de facto
The Court considered
sovereignty over the territory.11
“objective factors and practical concerns” in conducting its
functional analysis and in determining that the United States
maintained functional control over the detainees.12
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia, in their
dissenting opinions, criticized the majority for overstepping its
bounds in granting these new rights.13 Each pointed out
possible problems with or repercussions from the decision.14
Justice Scalia devoted attention to what he termed the
“disastrous consequences” of the majority opinion.15
He
cautioned that the holding “will almost certainly cause more
6. Id. at 2262.
7. Id. at 2258.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 2251-52. See also Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval
Stations, Feb. 23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, T.S. No. 418, Art. III.
10. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2248.
11. Id. at 2253. For a detailed discussion of Boumediene and the concept
of de facto sovereignty, see Anthony J. Colangelo, “De Facto Sovereignty”:
Boumediene and Beyond, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 623, 627-32, 662-69 (2009)
(opining that the de facto sovereignty the Court found at Guantanamo likely
exists nowhere else in the world).
12. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2258.
For another analysis of
Boumediene, see Comment, Extraterritorial Reach of Writ of Habeas Corpus,
122 HARV. L. REV. 395 (2008).
13. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2279-93 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at
2293-2307 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
14. See, e.g., id. at 2279 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2295 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
15. Id. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Americans to be killed”16 and concluded that “[t]he Nation will
live to regret what the Court has done today.”17 Justice Scalia
pointed to evidence showing that, of the detainees that the DoD
has released from Guantanamo, approximately 30 have
He argued that this data
returned to the battlefield.18
“illustrates the incredible difficulty of assessing who is and who
is not an enemy combatant in a foreign theater of operations
where the environment does not lend itself to rigorous evidence
Essentially, Justice Scalia argued that the
collection.”19
military, rather than the courts, is in the best position to
determine friend or foe.20 If the DoD in fact released terrorists
inadvertently, under procedures the Court determined were
inadequate to protect the detainees, then the heightened
review, as now mandated by the Court, would doubtless result
in the release, back to the battlefield, of even more terrorists
who feign false imprisonment as innocent bystanders.
Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts expressed
additional concerns about providing detainees access to U.S.
military witnesses, who may be otherwise unavailable, at war
in a combat zone.21 They also resisted releasing classified
information to detainee counsel, which could be used against
U.S. forces or to the advantage of the terrorist enemy.22 Noting
that the DoD relied on previous Court decisions, namely
Eisentrager,23 in moving detainees all the way from
Afghanistan to Cuba, Justice Scalia chastised the majority for
essentially changing the rules in the middle of the war.24
Concluding his discussion of the decision’s consequences, he
warned that “how to handle enemy prisoners in this war will
ultimately lie with the branch that knows least about the

16. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 2307 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 2294-95 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 2295 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 2295-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 2295 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 2288 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
23. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (holding that habeas did
not attach for alien war criminals detained by U.S. forces in Germany).
24. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2296 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

5

2010]KEEPING BOUMEDIENE OFF THE BATTLEFIELD 401
national security concerns that the subjects entails.”25
The Boumediene dissenters raise an issue that has
slithered into today’s modern battlefield and one that must be
confronted by national security policy makers: lawfare.
Lawfare is the concept that the current enemy, or any enemy
for that matter, will use our laws and general compliance with
the Rule of Law against us. The term was coined in 2001 by
then-Colonel, now Major General, Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., of the
U.S. Air Force, in an article questioning whether lawfare
undercuts the effectiveness of the military.26 The Boumediene
dissenters would likely argue that it does. More significantly,
Boumediene could be described as a form of fratricide—selfimposed, self-perpetuating lawfare.
Will the concerns of the dissenters be realized? Is the
majority opinion an attempt by the Court to structure a remedy
applicable only to Guantanamo Bay, perhaps in order to make
a political statement or rectify a perceived particularized
wrong? Regardless of the answers, the fact remains that the
decision provides a precedential framework for analysis. The
Court must be taken at its word. In its holding, the Court
fashioned a new test for determining whether a foreign fighter
detained overseas may rely on the habeas right.27 In applying
this test, a subsequent court could conceivably determine that
the United States exercises functional control over a U.S.
prisoner of war holding or detention camp located in a foreign
area, particularly where the area is a traditional Occupied
Territory under the laws of war—where U.S and/or coalition
forces are the occupiers. For some of the practical reasons and
obstacles described herein, Boumediene should not be
extended.
Under Boumediene, did prisoners held at Abu Ghraib
25. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
26. Col. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Interventions:
Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Century Conflicts (unpublished
working
paper),
available
at
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/Web%20Working%20Papers/Use%20of%2
0Force/Dunlap2001.pdf. For a recent analysis of the rise of lawfare as a legal
concept, see Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare: A Decisive Element of 21st
Century Conflicts?, 54 JOINT FORCE Q. 34 (2009).
27. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2258.
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during the height of the United States’ occupation of Iraq
possess habeas rights?28 Does habeas attach to the prisoners
currently held in overseas locations, such as Bagram Air Base
in Afghanistan?29 Notwithstanding current restrictions on the
use of certain areas for military purposes, what if the United
States chose to establish a Guantanamo Bay-like location in
Antarctica, or in space? Or in the middle of an ocean, on a
ship, or on a man-made island? The questions are fair ones,
and some are already being asked by commentators.
To many who have followed the Court’s decisions in this
area, the holding is no surprise. Boumediene reinforced a
position the Court began to signal a few years earlier. In 2004,
in Rasul v. Bush, the Court found that the statutory habeas
corpus provisions contained in the U.S. Code30 applied to the
Guantanamo detainees.31
And, in deciding Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld in 2006, the Court applied Geneva Convention
protections to the Guantanamo detainees.32 Will this trend by
the Court of providing rights to detained foreign fighters
continue? Referring to Boumediene, former Attorney General
Michael Mukasey expressed concern that the trend could
continue when he warned that our wartime efforts in
Afghanistan could become an evidentiary nightmare and turn
into CSI: Kandahar.33 With this in mind, what measures could
28. On the same day Boumediene was decided, the Supreme Court ruled
that U.S. citizens detained in Iraq have habeas rights. Munaf v. Geren, 128
S. Ct. 2207 (2008).
29. This is not a theoretical question. Judge John Bates of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia held that Boumediene applied to
three non-Afghani foreign fighters detained by coalition forces at the Theater
Internment Facility in Bagram, Afghanistan. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F.
Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009). The United States is appealing the decision. See
Motion for Certification of this Court’s April 2, 2009 Order for Interlocutory
Appeal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and for a Stay of Proceedings
Pending Appeal, Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009) (No.
06 Civ. 1669), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/
2009/04/us-bagram-appeal-filling-4-10-09.pdf.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2006).
31. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481-84 (2004).
32. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629-33 (2006).
33. Michael B. Mukasey, Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Remarks at the Meeting of the American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy
Research
(July
21,
2008),
available
at
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the DoD undertake?
II. Boumediene in the Pentagon
The scope of the problem the DoD may face is a bit
daunting.
What could happen—and, in the case of the
Guantanamo detainees, what is happening—is that foreign
detainees held by U.S. forces in locations deemed to be the
functional equivalent of United States territory could be
entitled not just to Geneva protections (for prisoners of war) or
Detainee Treatment Act34 protections (in the case of enemy
combatants at Guantanamo Bay not declared prisoners of war),
but also to habeas review by a federal district court. If the
functional analysis test of Boumediene is extended, or is
interpreted by the DoD to extend to physical locations other
than Guantanamo, then foreign fighters will be afforded
additional protections under the U.S. Constitution and U.S.
laws—protections normally reserved for U.S. citizens or other
persons in the country.35
These new rights could include a right to counsel, Miranda
warnings, heightened due process, and countless other rights
and privileges normally associated with citizenship or presence
in the United States. Imagine a military commander needing
probable cause to detain—or worse, some higher level of proof
to attack—an enemy!36 The implications are mind-boggling to

http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/July/08-opa-633.html.
34. Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739-44 (2005).
35. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Gerald Neuman, The
Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REV.
259 (2009). See also Implications of the Supreme Court‟s Boumediene v. Bush
Decision for Detainees at Guantanamo Bay: Before the H. Armed Services
Comm., 110th Cong. (2008) (testimony of Neal A. Katyal, Professor,
Georgetown University Law Center) (opining that the entire Constitution
applies to Guantanamo, not just the habeas provision), available at
http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/FC073008/Katyal_Testimony073008.pdf.
36. Practically speaking, commanders conduct a per se probable cause
analysis when, under the Laws of Armed Conflict, they evaluate a target,
including whether it is a lawful military target and whether there is a lawful
military purpose to attack. This process and the resulting decision, while
quite formalized, are neither designed nor intended to be introduced as
evidence in a federal court.
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a military professional. Our military force would essentially be
converted into a de facto law enforcement organization or
would have such an organization as its adjunct.
Such
extension would completely change the face of combat.37
Perhaps some of these examples are far-fetched; the issue,
though, is how far toward this end will the courts go? They
should go no further than Boumediene. If, however, courts
continue the trend and extend this holding, how would the DoD
meet these new requirements?
Programmatically and institutionally, extension would
require a re-evaluation of the DoD’s policies, regulations,
training, and organization. Currently, all military personnel
are trained to the Geneva standard under the DoD Law of War
Program.38 This program ensures that service members are
trained in and abide by the international legal norms of
warfare. Would the DoD implement a similar program to
ensure compliance with domestic laws during combat
operations, including detention operations? And, if so, should
it be separate from the Law of War Program or integrated into
it?
A progressive extension of Boumediene may require service
members in combat to abide by constitutional provisions
normally applicable to domestic law enforcement personnel.
Such an extension would require a massive training and
education program to be implemented department-wide. This
training might include instruction on the court-directed
domestic laws that might now be applicable, essentially a
shifting body of criminal law for the battlefield.
In
37. A fundamental question regarding the use of military force in
counterterrorism operations is which law applies. Specifically, do traditional
law enforcement rules apply, or do the laws of warfare apply? This question
is discussed in detail in Gregory E. Maggs, Assessing the Legality of
Counterterrorism Measures Without Characterizing Them as Law
Enforcement or Military Action, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 661 (2007) (arguing that
neither a law enforcement nor a military framework applies but, rather, a
unique counterterrorism paradigm).
38. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Dir. No. 2311.01E, DoD Law of War Program
(May 9, 2006), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d2311_01e.pdf.
This directive implements measures to ensure DoD compliance with the laws
of war as detailed in international agreements, primarily the Geneva
Conventions.
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implementing this new standard, both the DoD and the
military might be required to implement several new
procedures, including: training packages for new entrants at
basic training installations, annual refresher training,
formalized procedures for integration into major military
training exercises and actual military operations, a reporting
procedure for violations, and benchmarks for methods of
effectiveness. The International Committee of the Red Cross
(“ICRC”) might choose to monitor U.S. forces not only for
compliance with international law but also for compliance with
our applicable domestic laws. The DoD would be interested in
the ICRC’s new focus area and would need to implement
procedures to address these new areas of international
scrutiny.
As the DoD attempts to operationalize Boumediene, it
must consider the new concept of how to support a federal case
while concomitantly conducting military operations. Justice
Scalia, in his dissent, noted that the Boumediene holding “sets
our military commanders the impossible task of proving to a
civilian court, under whatever standards this Court devises in
the future, that evidence supports the confinement of each and
every enemy prisoner.”39 Practically speaking, this is already
happening in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia as the Guantanamo detainees’ habeas cases
progress.40 The Supreme Court is not, as Justice Scalia noted,
establishing the rules under which these cases will proceed.
That task has fallen on the district court judges, specifically
Senior Judge Thomas F. Hogan, who has been charged with
establishing general rules for the administration and
management of most of these cases.41
39. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2307 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
40. Judge Thomas F. Hogan issued a Preliminary Consolidated
Management Order on November 6, 2008 and a Consolidated Management
Order on December 17, 2008, which detail common procedures for most of the
habeas cases. In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., Misc. No. 08-0442,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97095 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2008); In re Guantanamo Bay
Detainee Litig., Misc. No. 08-0442, 2008 WL 5275914 (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 2008).
41. Press Release, United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, DC Chief Judge Meets with Judges to Discuss District Court
Procedures for Guantanamo Cases (July 2, 2008) [hereinafter DC District
Court Press Release], available at http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/public-
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These rules and procedures will be vitally important not
only for the process, but also for the DoD and combat soldiers
whose actions they will dictate. Courts will create, and lawyers
argue endlessly about, such important matters as the definition
of “enemy combatant,” the standard of proof for this yet-to-be
defined term, the admissibility of evidence, the scope and
breadth of exclusionary rules, presumptions afforded to
government evidence, whether the presence of the detainee is
required, access to government witnesses, the extent of
government disclosures of exculpatory evidence pursuant to
Brady v. Maryland,42 and a host of other procedural and
substantive issues. Every issue that may arise in a federal
criminal case will have to be addressed, interpreted, decided,
and applied to the current and future unique enemy prisoner
habeas actions. These procedures create daunting tasks.
Enter CSI: Kandahar. Extending the Boumediene holding
would require detailed procedures for the collection,
preservation, and maintenance of “evidence.” Normally, the
military treats information regarding enemy captives as
battlefield information or intelligence. Military personnel
process this information, important to the conduct of military
operations, through intelligence channels.
Intelligence
analysts and commanders use the information to determine
enemy strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and locations
important to the commander on the ground. Treating captured
enemy information as evidence in a federal case would require
an entirely new method of collecting and processing
intelligence. More likely, the DoD and the intelligence agencies
would choose to establish an entirely separate but parallel
system to process and sanitize battlefield intelligence
information for transmittal to federal courts because of the
significant risk to intelligence sources and methods.
The DoD may be forced to address these federal evidence
requirements.
Standards may have to be established,
beginning with procedures to determine what constitutes the
docs/system/files/Guantanamo-PressRelease070208.pdf; In re Guantanamo
Bay Detainee Litig., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97095; In re Guantanamo Bay
Detainee Litig., 2008 WL 5275914.
42. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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equivalent of probable cause to detain, and including
procedures for, inter alia, the seizure and collection of evidence,
chain of custody, evidence storage and maintenance, evidence
authentication, and witness availability.43 This may, in turn,
require procedures to formalize investigations, including a
requirement of a pseudo-criminal case file for every detained
enemy.
Certainly, service members do not have the training to
make and prove a federal case. Service members on the ground
are now familiar with basic evidence collection requirements,
and great strides have been taken in Iraq and Afghanistan to
formalize information collection resulting from raids.44 Site
exploitation teams and specially trained personnel have
assisted in gathering and maintaining site intelligence
information, which may later be used as evidence, normally in
an Iraqi or Afghani court. But imagine if every military
operation required a police-like crime scene analysis, with the

43. These concerns are not unfounded. In arguing evidence procedures
and standards before Judge Richard Leon in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia, detainee counsel argued, among other things, that the
standard of proof to determine whether a detainee is in fact an enemy
combatant should be the criminal conviction standard of beyond a reasonable
doubt. Judge Leon ordered the lesser standard of proof by a preponderance of
the evidence. Boumediene v. Bush, No. 04-1166 (D.D.C. Aug. 27, 2008),
available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/08/leoncase-manage-order-8-27-08.pdf. Moreover, the U.S. District Court for the
District of South Carolina addressed this issue of standard of proof in the
case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. Hamdi, a U.S. citizen, was captured as an enemy
combatant in Afghanistan, transferred to Guantanamo, and moved to the
Naval brig in Charleston, South Carolina after it was determined that he was
a U.S. citizen. He sought habeas review. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,
510-11 (2004) (plurality). The district court determined that he was entitled
to habeas review and that he was entitled to have the government prove his
status by a heightened standard of proof. Id. at 511-16. The U.S. Supreme
Court reversed the latter part of this holding. Id. at 531-33. One
commentator described this heightened standard initially imposed by the
district court as, indeed, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Terry Gill
& Elies van Sliedregdt, Guantanamo Bay: A Reflection on Legal Rights and
Status of „Unlawful Enemy Combatants‟, 1 UTRECHT L. REV. 28, 42 (2005).
44. See, e.g., Capt. Robin Worch, IA Learns Evidence Gathering From
Cavalry Troops, TASK FORCE MOUNTAIN, Aug. 12, 2007, http://www.taskforce
mountain.com/stories/5-stories/316-20080813-p3-1 (describing efforts by U.S.
troops to train the new Iraqi Army on evidence collection procedures to assist
in criminal prosecutions).
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collection of evidence to be used in a federal court. Soldiers
simply cannot conduct such an undertaking, nor should they be
required to.
Military law enforcement personnel are a limited asset on
the battlefield, busily investigating alleged misconduct by
military personnel, contract fraud, and the deaths of service
members. The DoD would be hard pressed to meet new
stringent investigative and evidentiary requirements. The
DoD may have to adjust its force structure and dramatically
increase the capacity of the services’ law enforcement
investigative agencies, a precarious undertaking for a military
already stretched thin. Or, perhaps the DoD would create a
new habeas investigative agency, uniformed and/or civilian, to
accompany forces on the battlefield. One solution is to use
another federal law enforcement agency, such as the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (“F.B.I.”), to augment military forces,
similar to the manner in which the U.S. Coast Guard augments
U.S. Navy operations during law enforcement actions at sea.45
In addition to programmatic and organizational
challenges, the DoD may be forced to consider Boumediene in
the planning and execution of military strategy in particular
theaters or on specified operations. The DoD would likely take
necessary steps, perhaps in consultation with the Department
of State, to ensure that functional control does not attach as
war plans are drafted and executed. The DoD may desire, for
example, to be invited into a theater of operation, as opposed to
conducting a forced entry; to have time-specific “stationing”
agreements in place with the legitimate or proxy authority,
trumpeting the sovereign authority of the host nation (or, at a
minimum, a similar unilateral proclamation from the host
nation); to have a United Nations Security Council Resolution
(“UNSCR”) or similar pronouncement from an international
organization, containing language disavowing United States
45. See 10 U.S.C. § 379 (2006) (requiring U.S. Coast Guard personnel to
be assigned to Navy vessels in order to conduct law enforcement—including
See also CTR. FOR LAW & MILITARY
drug interdiction—operations).
OPERATIONS, DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 206 (2009) (noting that
the Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment unit actually assumes
constructive command of the vessel during the conduct of the law
enforcement operation).
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functional control; or to avoid declaring, or taking cumulative
actions amounting to, United States functional control.
Consider detention operations themselves and the prisoner
of war/corrections conundrum that would ensue. A new
paradigm for battlefield detention, temporary holding, and
transfer to permanent internment facilities may be necessary.
Detaining enemy fighters may become a risky endeavor, from
the perspective of ensuring compliance with new yet uncertain
legal norms or in seeking to mitigate litigation risk. The DoD
would need to formalize specific guidelines, perhaps a set of
Standing Rules of Detention Operations. Military corrections
facilities and guards currently exist, but not in the scope or
breadth that would be required with an extension of the
Boumediene holding. More practically, will military guards be
required to provide these detainees with televisions, a law
library, and other privileges determined by our courts to be
constitutional rights of inmates in U.S. prisons?
Clearly, facilities and leases similar to Guantanamo Bay
would be avoided. The DoD may, however, be cautiously
inclined to establish detention agreements with a host nation.
For an Army of Occupation, where the risk of a functional
control determination is greater, the United States may
desire—whether through Congressional action, treaty or
international
agreement,
or
simple
memoranda
of
understanding—to effectively cede functional control of
detention facilities to the occupied nation, a third nation, or an
international body.
In some scenarios, it may not be
operationally wise or safe to transfer prisoners in a war zone to
a third party, particularly one less capable of operating and
defending the facility. And, for the same reason the United
States may pursue this agreement, third parties may seek to
avoid it, or else risk a political backlash or a wave of detainee
counsel seeking to meet with clients and file countless habeas
actions on their behalf. Our coalition partners certainly are not
interested in conducting—much less managing—battlefield
detentions of enemy fighters.
Further, the “take-no-prisoners” mantra is unacceptable,
whether viewed from a national, organizational, or individual
perspective. Unfortunately, some commentators and pundits
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who have decried Boumediene have either endorsed a take-noprisoners policy or at least predicted that one will eventually
come into being. A policy of taking no prisoners, either express
or implied, can never be an option for a civilized nation or its
citizens and service members. The DoD must emphasize that
such an approach, whether created intentionally or through
benign neglect, is unacceptable. To achieve this goal, the DoD
will need to establish procedures, a training program, and an
evaluation mechanism to avoid a “take-no-prisoners”
organizational tone from taking hold.
The DoD is not the only entity affected. An extension of
Boumediene would require a substantial investment of other
federal resources not previously required for a war effort.
Federal courts and the Department of Justice will bear a huge
load under such an extension. Both the federal court system—
specifically the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia—and the Department of Justice have already taken
exhaustive post-Boumediene measures to handle the relatively
few cases currently coming out of Guantanamo Bay.46 The 250
or so habeas cases from Guantanamo Bay detainees pale in
comparison to the potential tens of thousands that could be
filed by prisoners if Boumediene is extended.47 Without major
changes to meet such a scenario, judicial resources would be
overwhelmed. Further, the impact of this decision on the
separation of powers and an independent executive branch is
uncertain, and beyond the scope of this discussion.
In summary, from a department-wide perspective, the DoD
is in the untenable position of having to conduct a war and plan
for future engagements in an uncertain legal landscape.
46. See, e.g., Mukasey, Remarks at the Meeting of the American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, supra note 33; DC District
Court Press Release, supra note 41.
47. For an example of the impact on one agency, the DoD, see Dell’Orto,
supra note 4. Mr. Dell’Orto indicates that the future implications of
Boumediene, should it be extended, would have a “crippling” effect on the
DoD. Id. at 7. The tremendous strain of these 250 cases will also affect, and
indeed has already affected, numerous other agencies. For the District of
Columbia cases alone, the Court, the DoD, law enforcement, intelligence
agencies, and other agencies were required to devote substantial assets,
standing up Guantanamo teams to assist in processing information for the
court and parties.
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Whether any DoD personnel have or will have functional
control over detained enemy personnel is not a question easily
answered but one that must be formally addressed, so that
troops on the ground can operate effectively and in compliance
with the law.
III. Boumediene in Bagram and on the Battlefield
Boumediene, and the potential extension of its holding,
impacts U.S. detention operations not only at Guantanamo Bay
but also at Bagram and other current or future detention
facilities. As a preliminary matter, the natural question in
light of Boumediene is how necessary or beneficial is
Guantanamo Bay?
If the DoD initially established
Guantanamo Bay for its foreign location—more convenient for
U.S.-based intelligence and interrogation personnel—then, in
light of Boumediene, the base is no longer “foreign.” The
purported freedom from domestic legal requirements initially
presumed at Guantanamo no longer exists. As the current
administration seeks to close Guantanamo48—whether due to
legal, political, or policy reasons—it is clear that Boumediene
has done away with at least one benefit of housing detainees at
Guantanamo.
Could Boumediene impact current detention activities in
Bagram? If Boumediene reaches that facility, the Eisentrager
Court’s worst fears would be realized.49 Military interrogations
48. See Memorandum on Directing Certain Actions With Respect to
Acquisition and Use of Thomson Correctional Center To Facilitate Closure of
Detention Facilities at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, 75 Fed. Reg. 1015 (Dec.
15, 2009). See also Charlie Savage, Delay Expected on Illinois Plan for
Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2009, at A1 (reporting that officials believe
Guantanamo Bay will be closed by 2011 at the earliest).
49. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 779 (1950). The Court
stated that:
Such trials would hamper the war effort and bring aid and
comfort to the enemy. They would diminish the prestige of
our commanders, not only with enemies but with wavering
neutrals. It would be difficult to devise more effective
fettering of a field commander than to allow the very
enemies he is ordered to reduce to submission to call him to
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might require court approval, or worse, the presence of a
detainee’s counsel. Moving a detainee may likewise require
approval from the court. Conditions of confinement might be
reviewable by a court. Military prison guards may be liable to
their enemy captives in constitutional tort. The implications,
again, are vast.
In addition to detention operations in a theater of war,
Boumediene may directly impact actual day-to-day combat
operations. Justice Scalia warned that Boumediene could
“cause more Americans to be killed.”50 Practically speaking, he
was referring to a situation where a court releases a terrorist
who returns to fight against Americans.
Additionally,
battlefield impact and risk to service members for other
reasons is not improbable.
As a preliminary matter, the issue arises in determining
when habeas rights attach. Habeas would attach on the
battlefield only if the United States exercises functional control
over a combatant—that is, if it exercises the functional
equivalent of legal sovereignty over the detainee. In a country
like Afghanistan, or even Iraq, there is no question that
functioning governments active in inter- and intra-state affairs
are operating, and the nations maintain their sovereignty. But
does (or would) the United States operate in a pocket or
umbrella of sovereignty in either nation for purposes of
Boumediene? Liberal stationing agreements, UNSCRs, or
other documents authorizing or defining the scope and breadth
of authority for U.S. forces in a country could be read to grant
Boumediene-like autonomy. During the heightened occupation
of Iraq, and the initial invasion of Afghanistan, a stronger
argument could have been made that habeas in fact attached to
account in his own civil courts and divert his efforts and
attention from the military offensive abroad to the legal
defensive at home. Nor is it unlikely that the result of such
enemy litigiousness would be a conflict between judicial and
military opinion highly comforting to enemies of the United
States.
Id.
50. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2294 (2008) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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in-country detentions. And, in a certain area of occupation,
such as post-war Germany, or immediately following invasive
hostilities, the case is again much closer.
If a U.S. soldier operates in a pocket of sovereignty, habeas
rights may attach to any enemy he seizes or captures on the
battlefield. Those rights would remain during temporary
detention, transfer, and long-term detention. In this (hopefully
unlikely) situation, U.S. combat troops would have to be
trained in the latest version of habeas law for the battlefield.
They would need to know not only the operational
requirements and details of the military operation—for
example, seizing terrain or raiding a compound—but also the
legal niceties associated with capturing an enemy who has
constitutional rights and seizing the evidence that might be
necessary to keep that enemy in detention and off of future
battlefields. At the very least, these new requirements would
be a distraction to an undertaking where focus and attention to
detail are vital, a distraction that could be deadly.
Essentially, troops on patrol would be carrying the full
panoply of rights and privileges afforded under the U.S.
Constitution in their assault packs. Every enemy encountered
would be entitled to rummage through the pack to choose the
U.S. domestic law—the legal weapon51—to use against the
soldier. In effect, the military operation would be converted
into a pseudo-law enforcement search and seizure operation.
U.S. combat troops would be no different than police officers on
patrol in any town or city in the United States. The military
would cease to exist as we know it and would become nothing
more than a deployable F.B.I.
As indicated above, evidence experts and/or law
enforcement experts may be integrated into the operation.
These individuals are likely not familiar with military
operations and have not trained with the unit to which they
would be assigned. The potential for confusion, hesitation,
mistaken identity, and uncertainty is great. Each creates a
recipe for fratricide, enemy advantage, or worse—mission
failure and defeat.
51. The Court in Eisentrager called this “placing the litigation weapon in
unrestrained enemy hands.” Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 779.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/16

18

414

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:2

Intelligence operations will be the most vulnerable. If
court-directed discovery occurs, a unit’s intelligence files would
become the equivalent of a law enforcement investigative file.
Information deemed relevant to the defense, including
information that the United States expended significant
resources, and potentially lives, to obtain, would become
discoverable in some form. Valuable intelligence sources and
methods, some irreplaceable, would be lost. Sources would dry
up or perhaps be revealed and killed.
Consider the sad and dangerous contradiction. Military
planners and intelligence officers study and analyze an enemy,
compiling tens of thousands of pieces of information into a
precise operations plan, targeted at important leaders or
facilities. Troops receive an order, conduct mission-specific
training, and prepare to execute. Approvals are obtained from
appropriate commanders. A joint and multi-national combined
arms operation ensues to attain the military objective sought.
Conventional troops, special operations forces, combat aircraft,
artillery support, and overhead assets all converge on the
target in a dangerous and complex culmination of modern
military power. Enemy, friendly, and civilian lives are lost,
and prisoners are taken. Specialized teams exploit the site and
sweep through the complex, retrieving valuable enemy
information that will assist in future operations and save
American lives. Now the contradiction is revealed. All the
information relevant to a federal court case—information
gained in the planning, execution, and exploitation of the
mission—is transmitted back to a U.S. court, to counsel, and,
perhaps, back to the same enemy captives who required so
much time, effort, resources, and lives to capture. This truly is
a sad and dangerous contradiction. Soldiers will have risked
their lives to regurgitate the fruits of their sweat, toil, and
blood back to the enemy. This example illustrates why
Boumediene must stop at Guantanamo Bay.
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IV. Conclusion
Strikingly, in the penultimate paragraph of his dissent in
Boumediene, Chief Justice Roberts asked “who has won?”52
The apparent answer is that no one wins. Not the detainees,
as Chief Justice Roberts wrote, for they are left “with only the
prospect of further litigation to determine the content of their
new habeas right.”53 Not the U.S. Congress, as its role in
legislating “has been unceremoniously brushed aside,”54 and
not the “Great Writ,” (the Writ of Habeas Corpus), as it has
been relegated to application at some “jurisdictionally quirky
outpost” known as Guantanamo Bay.55 Forebodingly, Chief
Justice Roberts concludes that two other more important
entities have also not won:
[And] [n]ot the rule of law, unless by that is
meant the rule of lawyers, who will now arguably
have a greater role than military and intelligence
officials in shaping policy for alien enemy
combatants. And certainly not the American
people, who today lose a bit more control over the
conduct of this Nation’s foreign policy to
unelected, politically unaccountable judges.56
In a Boumediene environment, military personnel would
know that essentially every prisoner is a federal case. The
federal court would, in a real sense, be there on the battlefield
too, dictating the conduct of military operations. If Boumediene
were applied to the battlefield, plans, procedures, and military
tactics would undoubtedly change. In an environment where
the United States exercises functional control, the Boumediene
protections, and perhaps even more domestic legal protections,
would apply to detained personnel. But in the traditional
battlefield environment, where the United States does not
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2293 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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exercise functional control, it would be business as usual for
our military forces. The DoD (or a court) would conduct the
functional analysis, and soldiers would know, in theory, during
the planning stages and execution of a mission, whether
habeas rights lie with the enemy they may detain. In the
worst-case scenario, the military planners would make the
wrong decision on whether functional sovereignty lies with the
United States. The result is, essentially, Guantanamo all over
again—a painful and untenable situation not only for the
military but also for the executive branch and the court system
that may have to hear the cases.
Soldiers know the business of seizing and holding terrain,
and it is difficult enough to fight a war against an enemy that
ascribes to and follows the Geneva Conventions. Fighting
against terrorists who openly disregard the Conventions,
behead prisoners and kill civilians is even more daunting.
Extending Boumediene to the battlefield makes a difficult
military situation even worse. On a spectrum of negative
repercussions, extending Boumediene is the practical
equivalent of placing a pile of rocks into a soldier’s already full
rucksack; tauntingly and spitefully laughing in the face of
service members who have risked their lives on dangerous
missions, not to mention the friends, family, and a Nation
whose loved ones were lost on those missions; and giving the
enemy, on a legal silver platter, former captives to return to the
fight or valuable intelligence information with which to kill
more Americans. The impact and effect would be felt from the
highest levels of the DoD, to theater commanders, to
commanders on the ground, to soldiers in the field executing a
mission, and to a regretful Nation. Boumediene should not and
cannot be extended.
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